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BOOK REVIEWS
ON TORTS. By Warren A. Seavey.1 Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1954. Pp. 72. $2.00
2
SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS. By William L. Prosser.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1953. Pp. xi, 627.
COGITATIONS

When the nation's leading authority in a particular field of the
law publishes a group of essays, those who work in the field have
occasion to congratulate themselves. Recently, each of the two
leading authorities in the field of Torts published such a collection.
Both collections were prepared as units of distinguished lecture series
named after two of the giants of American law-Dean Prosser's essays
comprising the fourth series of Thomas M. Cooley Lectures at Michigan, and Professor Seavey's essays comprising the third series of
Roscoe Pound Lectures at Nebraska. They are related in the additional
respect that Prosser dedicates his book to Seavey.
The two books are quite dissimilar. Seavey's Cogitations is composed of three lectures which are knit together as a unit depicting
the whole law of Torts-its nature, origin, development and future.
Naturally the treatment must be broad and generalized, presenting
a bird's-eye view and providing only occasional and limited citation.
Prosser's Selected Topics is composed of five lectures which give intensive and thorough treatment to particular subjects, together with
two articles previously published in law reviews. 3 The several
articles are unrelated and make no pretense of giving a general
picture of the whole field of Torts, but the citations are quite complete, almost exhaustive.
Mr. Seavey "cogitates" first on the nature of Torts and produces
some comments which every teacher addicted to the subject will
second. "Although a hundred years ago it did not have a name and
although it otherwise was so dimly perceived that in 1870 Holmes
thought it not a worthy subject for law school instruction, Torts is
in fact the gateway to the law. To the understanding heart it is the
most fascinating of subjects.... With criminal law and constitutional
law, which protect our freedoms, it shares the dubious distinction of
having great uncertainty as to the conclusions to be reached in particular cases, since it is difficult to give proper weight to the com1. Bussey Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
2. Dean, University of California School of Law, Berkely.
3. Three of the five lectures were published in The Michigan Law Review
after they were delivered but before the group came out in book form: Comparative Negligence, 51 MIcH. L. REv. 465 (1953); Interstate Publications,id.
959; Palsgraf Revisited, 52 id. 1 (1953).

657

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 8

peting interests and it is frequently impossible to do more than guess
the facts. As with those subjects, it must be flexible to respond to
the fast-moving changes in our ideas and economy. Like them, it
has little need for technicalities and great need for wisdom .... The
basic theories of Torts... permeate every branch of our jurisprudence.
...Thus the subject is important, not alone to lawyers who specialize
in personal injury or defamation practice, but equally so to attorneys
for banks, landowners, manufacturers, and all other persons engaged
in any form of business. Its rules are applicable to every act and
phase of life. Their correspondence to our ideals of practice and to
economic needs is of overwhelming importance to our national welfare." (Pp. 2-5)
Fourteen pages are needed to give a thumbnail sketch of the historical development of the law of Torts from the Anglo-Saxon "theft
bote" to the recent decisions permitting recovery for injury to an
unborn infant. A whole lecture is devoted to "refinements." Here "a
more minute examination" is given to the field of negligence. Its
nature is analyzed and the component parts are treated in some detail. As we know, Mr. Seavey explains both negligent conduct and
the scope of liability in terms of the concept of "risk." Negligence is
"conduct creating unreasonable risk of unintended harm to another
for which there is liability, if the harm is suffered." (P. 26.) The actor
"is liable if, but only if, the harm was within the risk created by his
conduct to a person within the circle of danger.... In other words,
in most cases, the reason for making a person liable for negligence
gives the limits of liability." (P. 32.) A lesser treatment is given also
to misrepresentation and defamation.
In the final lecture, Mr. Seavey sets forth his "relatively few complaints" with the present state of the law. I list some of them. In
the field of Negligence, he finds that the courts have developed unjust
rules regarding joint tortfeasors and contributory negligence. Release
of one tortfeasor should not automatically release another if this was
not intended; an amount paid by a supposed tortfeasor should be deducted from the damages due to the plaintiff from an actual tortfeasor
even though the payor is found not to be liable; contribution should be
allowed between tortfeasors. Contributory negligence should mitigate
damages, not bar recovery. In the field of defamation, the distinction
between libel and slander should be reconsidered, strict liability for
"statements which have unknown defamatory connotations" is not
warranted, and injunctive relief should be granted against personal
defamation. In the field of misrepresentation, recovery should be allowed "in every case of a negligent misstatement when the speaker
had reason to know that the person would rely upon it and when
the hearer did rely." Mr. Seavey prefaces his list of needed modifica-
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tions with a strong tribute to common law judges, and his faith in
the growth and development of the common law is such that he believes that his suggested changes can better be made by the courts
than by the legislature. Judicial changes in the law are not justified
in fields where they would materially affect prior transactions. "But
in the law of Torts predictability is chiefly important to prevent unnecessary litigation. Assuming that one has been at fault and has
caused harm to another, he comes within the general tort principle
which would impose liability upon him, and he is in no position to
complain that he should not pay for the harm merely because of a
prior decision on similar facts that no cause of action existed." (P. 67.)
I found Cogitations most interesting on the first reading, and I was
surprised at how many stimulating ideas it provoked when I read
it again for this review. I recommend that any teacher of Torts read
it twice. And practitioners and students will find it worthwhile too.
Of Dean Prosser's seven "Selected Topics," four are on some aspect
of negligence-res ipsa loquitur, proximate cause, contributory negligence, and landowner's liability to business guests. One is on defamation (interstate publication), one is on strict liability and one
is on the "Borderland of Tort and Contract." They all make good
articles-written in the familiar Prosser style-sprightly, interesting
and meaty. They are of course not all equally good, and one or two
of them, while most Torts authorities would be proud to have
written them, do not quite come up to the Prosser standard. These
leave the feeling that he was himself disappointed in them, having
picked the subject with the anticipation of being able to make a
substantial contribution but finding it necessary to be content with
something less.
Two topics were not lectures but were articles published in law
reviews sometimes earlier. The article on business guests appeared
in 1942 and is generally recognized as the leading treatment of the
subject. 4 The one on res ipsa loquitur appeared in 1949. 5 I do not
know whether it yet is accorded by general consensus the position of
leading article on the subject, but I do know that in my opinion it
occupies this position. I am delighted that it is published in thiscollection and thus made more easily available.
Both Seavey and Prosser agree on the undesirability of the commonlaw rule that contributory negligence completely bars recovery. Dean
Prosser devotes one article to "comparative negligence." He discusses the exceptions to the common-law rule and treats at some
length the various statutes which have modified it and the problems
which they raise, and he concludes the article with a draft of a model
4. Business Visitors and Invitees, 25 Mum. L.
20 CAN. B. REV. 446 (1943).
5. Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CALIF. L.

REV.

573 (1942),

REV.

183 (1949)

also in
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statute of two sections. 6 I think that the statute is an excellent one
and have no criticism of the second section, but I think the first
section would be improved by a slight revision. It is a little wordy,
and it makes the mistake of referring expressly and solely to the doctrine of last clear chance, though there are, at least in some jurisdictions, other exceptions to the contributory negligence rule. Does the
following seem slightly better? "In all actions hereafter accruing for
negligence, including wrongful death and other statutory actions,
contributory negligence, whether heretofore constituting a defense
or not, shall not bar recovery but shall have the effect of diminishing
damages in proportion to the amount of such contributory negligence."
The article on interstate defamation tackles a problem which is
incapable of satisfactory solution, a fact which Dean Prosser quite
adequately demonstrates. 7 He finds it necessary to recommend that
we cut the Gordian knot by having Congress to adopt a federal act
covering the matter.
The article on the borderland of tort and contract investigates a
field which has been largely neglected by writers. It was a very
useful service to provide a topographical map for this piece of terrain.
The contour lines are a little vague here and there, but attorney and
teacher alike will venture into the area with much more confidence
now that they have a suitable map to guide them.
Many readers will regard the article on the duty--proximate-cause
issue as the best one of the group. Appropriately entitled "Palsgraf
Revisited," it starts with a study of that case and warns that the
article will be an "expression of difficulties, uncertainties and doubts,
arriving at no very difficult conclusion." (P. 192.) Mr. Prosser then
proceeds to vindicate his warning. He demonstrates that "Duty is
only a word with which we state our conclusion that there is or is not
to be liability; it necessarily begs the question," and serves a useful
purpose only "in directing attention to the obligation to be imposed
upon the defendant, rather than the causal sequence of events" (Pp.
6. "1. In all actions hereafter accruing for negligence resulting in personal
injury or wrongful death or injury to property, including those in which
the defendant has had the last clear chance to avoid the injury, the contributory negligence of the person injured, or of the deceased, or of the owner of

the property, or of the person having control over the property, shall not bar

a recovery, but the damages awarded shall be diminished in proportion to
the amount of negligence attributable to the injured person or to the deceased or to the owner of the property or to the person having control over
the property.
"2. In any action to which section 1 of this act applies, the court shall make
findings of fact or the jury shall return a special verdict which shall state:
(a) the amount of the damages which would have been recoverable if
there had been no contributory negligence; and
(b) the extent to which such damages are diminished by reason of such
contributory negligence." Pp. 68-69.
7. He summarizes: "It seems safe to say that nowhere is there a state
of confusion to compare with this. If one went shopping for law in Bedlam,

this is what he might expect to buy." P. 122.
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213-14.) The concept of scope of the "risk" as applied either to the
consequences or to the plaintiff, he finds, affords only "an illusion
of certainty" (P. 220) and "is as vague, as empty, as unworkable and
as unsatisfactory an explanation of what is actually in the cases, as
even the physical mechanics of Beale" (P. 228); and the broadening
of the risk concept to include "normal consequences" "seems in part
at least to abandon the original reasoning and adds nothing in the way
of definiteness." (P. 221.) The test of "direct causation" is just "as
barren"; it merely comes "closer to recognition of the difficulties of
the problem and the many factors that may bear on it." (P. 232.)
The conclusion? "If there is any middle ground between the restricted scope of the original risk on the one hand, and the extreme
lengths to which even direct causation may be carried on the other,
it must lie in some reasonably close connection between the harm
threatened and the harm done." (P. 233, cf. p. 242.) This is not a rule
or a formula; it "is at most an approach." (Pp. 234, 242.)
I find no difficulty in agreeing with what Dean Prosser has to say.
It seems to me, indeed, that he is in some measure setting up straw
men to knock them down. Few would contend that the risk concept
affords any real assurance of certainty.8 The hazard created by a
particular act may be defined almost as broadly or as narrowly as
one wishes-it is often a matter of wording, just as the expression of
what actually happened is often a matter of wording.9 But the
idea of the risk is still helpful. It is a useful "approach," and it is
nonetheless an approach when it is broadened to include "normal consequences." There is little difference in speaking of the risk involved
and its normal consequences, or of the purpose of the rule violated by
the actor (the reason why his conduct was negligent), or of a "reason8. Even Mr. Seavey, the leading exponent of the risk concept, says: "It is
quite true that even this does not always give a definite result; there are
still many doubtful cases. But except in the abnormal and seldom recurring
situations it is possible to predict with some degree of accuracy the limits of
liability. In any event, this method of appraisal appears to be an advance
over the older phrases which seem to me to be completely meaningless."
COGITATIONS, p. 34.
9. The most famous example is the Texas peg-leg case, Hines v. Morrow,
236 S. W. 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921). Clarence Morris described the case as
follows. "[P]laintiff was one of two men sent out on a service truck to tow
a stalled car. The plaintiff made the tow rope fast and attempted to step
out from between the vehicles as the truck started. His artificial leg slipped
into a mud hole which had resulted from the defendant-railroad's disregard
of its statutory duty to maintain this portion of the highway. The plaintiff
was unable to extricate his pegleg and was in danger of being run over by
the car. He grabbed the tail gate of the truck to use its force to pull him loose.
A loop in the tow rope lassoed his good leg and it was broken. As long as
these details are considered significant facts of the case, the accident is unforseeable.... But ...the court quoted with approval the plaintiff's lawyer's
description of the 'facts' which was couched in these words: 'The case stated
in briefest form, is simply this: Appellee was on the highway, using it in
a normal manner, and slipped into this hole, created by appellant's negligence, and was injured in attempting to extricate himself." MORRIS, STUDIES
IN TORTS 254-55 (1954). The case is referred to by Prosser at p. 220.
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ably close connection between the harm threatened and the harm
done" (P. 233.) Risk, hazard, harm threatened-do they express different ideas? As many commentators have indicated already, the problem
of the limits of liability may be considered in terms of the duty element, the negligence element or the causation element. Most of
the courts speak of it in terms of cause, though there is general agreement that it is a policy decision, quite different from the determination
of factual cause. I myself would agree with Dean Prosser's present
view that it is better treated here, if, for no other reason, than that
decisions in terms of duty are more likely to be doctrinaire and
arbitrary, less likely to allow recognized consideration of the policy
aspects involved.
I like, too, the suggestion that it be phrased in terms of a reasonably
close connection between the risk involved and the damage suffered.
This is not a rule capable of being applied automatically. It is a
standard, expressed as a standard' 0-similar to "what a reasonable
prudent man would do under the same or similar circumstances"
in tort law, or "fair return on fair value" in public utility law or "due
process of law" in constitutional law or "fair competition" in trade
regulation. It involves administrative discretion and permits individualized application to the particular case without having to
express a rule to take care of it-a rule with language in it which
may cause difficulty in a case somewhat similar. In practice this
standard is more freely administered by the court (as distinguished
from the jury) than the prudent-man test for negligence is." For
this reason more emphasis is placed on prior holdings and certain
applications of the standard are likely to become crystalized. But
these crystalized applications should not be transformed to a detailed
set of rules which apply as rules to other types of situations by
10. Standards are "legally defined measures of conduct, to be applied by
or under the direction of tribunals ....
In framing standards the law seeks
neither to generalize by eliminating the circumstances nor to particularize
by including them; instead the law seeks to formulate the general expectation
of society as to how individuals will act in the course of their undertakings,
and thus to guide the common sense or expert intuition of jury or commission
when called on to judge of particular conduct under particular circumstances ....

[A] common idea of reasonableness or fairness runs through

them all, and in consequence they must have a valuable application with
time, place and circumstances. Moreover most of them contain a large moral
element and so application of them calls for common sense or the average
moral judgment rather than for deductive logic." Pound, Administrative Application of Legal Standards, 44 Am. B. Ass'N REP. 445, 456-57 (1919); see
also Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law, 7
TuLA= L. REv. 475, 485 (1933).
11. The test of whether the court should take the negligence standard from
the hands of the jury is itself a standard-whether a reasonable jury could
reasonably have found negligence. This is often not the test for determining
whether the court will take the issue of proximate cause out of the hands
of the jury. Sometimes it is said that the issue of legal cause, as distinguished
from cause in fact, is always for the court; but it is often left to the jury
with varying types of confusing instructions.

1955 ]

BOOK REVIEWS

analogy; the discretion involved in applying the standard should be
exercised in any new situation. A standard expressed like this can
be more easily handled by either court or jury than the usual alternative of a group of contradictory rules, and it describes what is actually being done to a surprisingly accurate degree.12
Of course, it fails to provide certainty of prediction in an individual
case. That is not what a standard is for. Perhaps it is merely "an
approach." But the standard of a reasonable prudent man in determining negligence has never been anything more. Justice Holmes
once inveighed against the uncertainty which it created and sought
to reduce it to a set of definite rules; but he failed in his objective
and courts and commentators alike agree now that the standard is
better. A difference between the two situations lies in the fact that
the negligence standard is applied usually by the jury while the one
on extent of liability is often applied by the courts. This accentuates
the natural tendency to rely on previous applications to particular
fact situations and sometimes serves to turn particular applications
into crystalized rules. This last tendency has produced much of our
difficulty. It should not be permitted to reach the point where the
"rule" obscures and supplants the standard from which it derives.
After all, an experienced court should be better able to exercise
the administrative discretion involved than an inexperienced jury,
and it should not find itself incapable of acting without a specific
rule to set out the exact result. Perhaps the very experience produces the difficulty. But other standards are handled by the court
adequately and properly, without breaking them down into a mass of
rules.
It would seem that a recognition of the technique of using a standard
in solving the problem of extent of liability will do much to eliminate
the overemphasis which has been given to the problem by courts
and teachers alike. We do not then look for prediction with certainty
and we are not as much concerned with reconciling a series of fact
13
applications.
12. Dean Prosser concludes his article with the declaration that "the old
words 'proximate' and 'remote' . . . convey [the idea] of some reasonable
connection between the original negligence and its consequences, between the

harm threatened and the harm done." (P. 242). Perhaps they do, but they
are apt to convey a number of other ideas, too. I think that speaking of
a reasonable connection between the risk and the injury makes the "approach
to the problem" a little more meaningful and lets either court or jury understand somewhat more clearly what it is trying to decide. Posing the problem
in terms of a standard, making it apparent that discretion is being exercised,
increases the likelihood that it will be wisely exercized, with due consideration
for the various policies involved. The term "proximate cause" seems more
likely to produce an attempt to reach a result through deductive reasoning
when the decision is not one which logic alone can determine. Judge Edgerton's test of "justly attachable cause" is phrased in terms of a standard, but
it provides less of a guide than the reasonable-connection test. Edgerton,
Legal Cause, 72 U. PA. L. REv. 211 & 343 (1924).
13. There is, of course, a good deal more to be said on the subject of
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Dean Prosser's remaining article is entitled, "The Principle of Rylands v. Fletcher." This suggests a rather dry and unstimulating
rehash of the facts and holding in that case, and I left this chapter
till the last in going through the book. But the reading changed
my opinion entirely. This is by far, I think, the best and most valuable
article in the collection. It accomplishes what the model law review
article should do, in providing an analysis of groups of cases in
such a way as to present a new and constructive principle which can
prove extremely helpful to courts, attorneys and teachers in handling
cases in the future.
The article starts with a treatment of Rylands and the English
cases following it, and concludes that they produce the rule that "the
defendant will be liable when he damages another by a thing or activity inappropriate to the place where it is maintained, in the light
of the character of that place and its surroundings." (P. 147.) (This is
the development of Lord Cairn's concept of the "non-natural use," as
expressed in his opinion in the House of Lords.) The article then
discusses the American cases, showing that a majority of the jurisdiction follow Rylands, despite the frequent statements to the contrary.
The wild-animal cases, the blasting and other ultrahazardous-activity
cases and the absolute-nuisance cases, when properly considered,
demonstrate "that the same courts which purport to reject the English
principle have in fact applied it under another name, and that under
that name the doctrine is universally applied in the United States.
There is in fact no case applying Rylands v. Fletcher which is not
reasonably duplicated in all essential respects by some American
decision which proceeds on the theory of nuisance." (P. 170).
Under the broad principle which derives from all of the cases,
liability is imposed upon a defendant who maintains a "condition or
activity which involves an unreasonable risk of harm to persons or
property in its vicinity." As in negligence cases, the unreasonableness
of the risk is determined by balancing the magnitude of the risk
(probability and gravity of the harm threatened) against "the utility
of the defendant's conduct, both to the defendant himself and to
the community."'14 But there are two differences from the negligence
cases: (1) the decision as to unreasonableness is made by the court,
proximate cause. Much of it is said by Dean Prosser himself in another recent
article, Proximate Cause in California, 28 CALIF. L. REV. 369 (1950). With
its factual grouping, it provides some very helpful analysis. I am sorry
that it was not reprinted in the book, too. There are some inconsistencies
between it an "Palsgraf Revisited," but we should all be permitted some
inconsistencies when considering the subject of proximate cause.
14. Dean Prosser adds here that if the risk is unreasonable, it need not be
extreme. "The Restatement's limitation of the principle to 'ultrahazardous
activities' appears to be definitely too narrow, unless 'ultrahazardous' is to
be defined in some other sense than that of extreme danger which we cannot eliminate." (P. 185)
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not the jury; and (2) the "risk must result from the defendant's
intentional conduct, and he must be aware of it." Finally, the condition
or activity must be "an extraordinary, abnormal, excessive or 'nonnatural' one foreign to most of the community"; it must be "inappropriate to its location." (Pp. 185-87).
My abstract of the article may give you the essential idea but almost certainly fails to carry the conviction which a reading of the
whole article will produce. If you pick out only one of Mr. Prosser's
"Selected Topics" to read, this is the one. If all of the appellate courts
would read it, a large portion of the field of Torts would rapidly
begin to take on a more sensible order. It is unfortunate that this
chapter was not previously published in a law review and thus may
not receive the dissemination it deserves. It is too bad, also, that the
article does not have a more enticing title. Can someone think of
a better name for the broad principle summarized in the preceding
paragraph than the "Principle of Rylands v. Fletcher"?
JOHN W.
* Dean,

Vanderbilt University School of Law.
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